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Thomas 0. Knight, and Alan E. Baquet 
We study the relationship between the off-farm labor decision and the limited-resource 
farmers' and spouses' off-farm wages, experience, education, and sources of income. We 
found that farmers' and spouses' off-farm experience and wages are significant factors in 
explaining the off-farm labor supply decision. Contrary to expectations, farm income var- 
iability is not significant in the farmers' and spouses' decision to seek off-farm work. The 
off-farm labor supply of farmers and their spouses is negatively correlated with income 
transfers from the government. It was also found that the spouse is a residual supplier of 
on-farm and off-farm labor. 
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sion 
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Improvement of economic and social condi- 
tions in the poorer areas of rural America is a 
central concern of the U.S. Depamnent of Ag- 
riculture (USDA; Swanson). Title XXV of the 
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade 
Act of 1990 states that the Secretary of Ag- 
riculture will provide outreach and technical 
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assistance to encourage and assist socially dis- 
advantaged farmers and ranchers to own and 
operate farms and ranches and to participate 
in agricultural programs. This assistance will 
include information on application and bid- 
ding procedures, farm management, and other 
essential information to participate in agricul- 
tural programs. More recently, the needs of 
limited-resource farmers were again recog- 
nized in the Agricultural Risk Protection Act 
of 2000. This Act mandated that the USDA 
increase its efforts to provide risk management 
tools and risk management education for lim- 
ited-resource minority farmers and ranchers. 
Despite a steady decline in number since 
1945, farms with $250,000 in gross sales or 
less remain important contributors to rural 
economies and U.S. agriculture (Perry et al.). 
These farms, which are referred to as small 
farms by the National Commission on Small 
Farms (USDA), constitute 90% of all U.S. 
468 Journal of Agriculnrral and Applied Economics, August 2004 
farms, own 67% of the farmland, and hold 
77% of the farm sector's net worth. They also 
contribute significantly to rural economies as 
purchasers of inputs and supplies and as pre- 
servers of the rural landscape (Mishra, El- 
Osta, and Steele). According to the typology 
of U.S. farms, limited-resource farms are in- 
cluded in the small farms category (Hoppe). 
As with the rest of small farms, limited-re- 
source households are also important for the 
rural economy of their communities. 
Traditionally, operators of commercial- 
sized farms rely on production and marketing 
contracts, vertical integration, futures contracts 
and hedging, financial reserves, and crop in- 
surance as means to manage farm risk (Har- 
wood et al.). Nevertheless, risk management 
tools available to limited-resource farmers are 
constrained by farm and nonfarm factors. Ac- 
cording to Dismukes, Harwood, and Hoppe, 
the use of crop insurance as a risk manage- 
ment tool by limited-resource farmers is min- 
imal because there is no crop insurance for 
most of the crops they grow. Furthermore, 
small acreages in row crops reduce the like- 
lihood of participation in the use of marketing 
contracts and the use of futures and options 
contracts. For example, small acreages would 
limit the ability of a producer to meet mini- 
mum futures contract size. Vergara et al. found 
that only 16% of the farmers used crop insur- 
ance, whereas 56% worked off-farm. There- 
fore, off-farm income seems an important as- 
pect of how limited-resource farmers manage 
risk. Wages and salaries are important sources 
of this off-farm income, but other sources such 
as Social Security are also leading sources of 
off-farm income for limited-resource farm op- 
erator households. This is not surprising given 
the high proportion of limited-resource farm- 
ers who are more than 65 years old (Dismu- 
kes, Harwood, and Bentley). 
The increased reliance on off-farm income 
by commercial farm operators has been well 
documented in the literature (Corsi and Fin- 
deis; Goodwin and Holt; Huffman; Huffman 
and El-Osta; Huffman and Lange; Lass and 
Gempesaw; Mishra and Goodwin; Mishra et 
al.; Mishra and Sandretto; Schultz; Sumner; 
Tokle and Huffman). Nevertheless, very little 
is known with respect to the limited-resource 
farm operator supply of off-farm work. This 
study aims at increasing the current knowl- 
edge on the role that farm income variability 
and other important economic variables play 
in the off-farm labor supply decision of lim- 
ited-resource farmers. 
Literature Review 
The farm typology developed by the USDA 
Economic Research Service (ERS) between 
1997 and 1998 categorizes farms into homo- 
geneous groups, based primarily on annual 
sales and occupation of the operators. The first 
group identified by the typology is the small 
family farm. Limited-resource farms lie within 
this group. Limited-resource farms are family 
farms with gross sales less than $100,000, 
farm assets less than $150,000, and farm op- 
erator household income less than $20,000 per 
year. All three conditions must be met in order 
for a small family farm to be classified under 
the limited-resource farm category. Unlike 
other types of fanns belonging to the small 
family farm group, limited-resource farm op- 
erators are not restricted to one major occu- 
pation. Limited-resource farmers can report 
farming, a nonfarm occupation, or retirement 
as their major occupation. The limited-re- 
source farm definition includes farmers with 
low sales, income, and assets, regardless of 
their major occupation (Hoppe). 
According to USDA-ERS Agricultural Re- 
source Management Study data, there were 
150,268 limited-resource farms in the United 
States in 1998. Most limited-resource farm op- 
erator households are located in the South, 
specifically the USDA farm production re- 
gions of Appal?chia, Delta States, Southeast, 
Southern Plains, Delaware, and Maryland 
(Dismukes, Harwood, and Hoppe). 
The circumstances of African American 
limited-resource farmers are especially strik- 
ing (Beale). The number of African Ameri- 
can-operated farms in the United States has 
declined dramatically from 925,708 farms in 
1920 to 18,451 farms in 1997. Even though 
the number of farms operated by Caucasians 
has declined in the same period (from 
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5,498,454 in 1920 to 1,864,201 in 1997), the 
rate of decline has been less severe (Reyn- 
olds). Nevertheless, the African American 
share of the farm operator's population in the 
South is considerable: 9% in South Carolina, 
8% in Mississippi, and 4% in Alabama and 
Louisiana. Thirty-six percent of African 
American operators are at least 65 years old, 
and there are relatively few young African 
American operators. Around 90% of African 
American-operated farms had sales less than 
$25,000 in 1997. African American-operated 
farms tend to be small-130 acres on average. 
They are less likely to harvest commodity 
crops. On the other hand, vegetables such as 
greens, cabbage, squash, okra, sweet corn, and 
watermelon are common. A few surveys have 
been conducted to quantify the training needs 
of limited-resource minority farmers in areas 
such as crop insurance and other risk manage- 
ment tools (Dismukes, Harwood, and Bent- 
ley). 
Several studies examining off-farm work 
participation of farm households have inves- 
tigated the factors that influence the off-farm 
work decision of farm families (Corsi and Fin- 
deis; Goodwin and Holt; Huffman; Huffman 
and El-Osta; Huffman and Lange; Lass and 
Gempesaw; Mishra and Goodwin; Mishra et 
al.; Mishra and Holthausen; Mishra and San- 
dretto; Schultz; Sumner; Tokle and Huffman). 
Shultz pointed out that off-farm employment 
is an important means by which farmers and 
their spouses attempt to reduce the variance of 
total income. 
In an econometric analysis of Illinois farm- 
ers' off-farm labor supply, Sumner found that 
the off-farm wage depends on the farmers' hu- 
man capital and the local labor market. He 
found that education significantly increased 
the probability of farm operators seeking off- 
farm work. On the other hand, other sources 
of income and farming experience significant- 
ly reduced the probability of farm operators 
seeking off-farm work. 
With the use of household survey data, To- 
kle and Huffman found that geographical dif- 
ferences have an effect on the off-farm labor 
participation decisions of farmers and their 
spouses. Education, race, and off-farm wage 
positively affected the probability of farm op- 
erators seeking off-farm work, and education 
and race positively affected the probability of 
the spouse seeking off-farm work. 
In an econometric analysis of Pennsylvania 
farm households, Lass and Gempesaw found 
that the probability of off-farm employment 
was affected significantly by the operator's 
age, spouse's age, spouse's education, farm 
sales, and other sources of income. 
In an econometric analysis of Kansas farm- 
ers' off-farm labor supply, Mishra and Good- 
win pointed out that commercial farmers re- 
ported the primary reason they worked 
off-farm was the variability, risk, and uncer- 
tainty associated with their farm income. That 
study showed a positive relationship between 
the coefficient of variation for farm income 
and off-farm work. The farmer's number of 
years of off-farm work experience and debt- 
to-asset ratio also positively influenced the 
probability of farm operators seeking off-farm 
work. On the other hand, farm experience, to- 
tal acres, government payments, cropping ef- 
ficiency, and educational seminars negatively 
affected the probability of farm operators 
seeking off-farm work. The spouse's number 
of years of off-farm experience, debt-to-asset 
ratio, and educational seminars positively af- 
fected the probability of the spouse seeking 
off-farm work. On the other hand, farm ex- 
perience, government payments, and children 
negatively affected the probability of the 
spouse seeking off-farm work. 
More recent studies have focused on the 
role of farm income variability and its rela- 
tionship with off-farm labor. In a recent pub- 
lication, Mishra and Sandretto discussed in de- 
tail the important role of off-farm employment 
in stabilizing the income of farm operators. 
They showed that farm household income var- 
iability remains an issue today and is rising, 
thus increasing the importance of off-farm 
work as a farm incomestabilizing agent. 
Another recent empirical analysis of Kan- 
sas and North Carolina farms conducted by 
Mishra and Holthausen showed that there is 
greater off-farm labor force participation as 
the variability of farm income increases and 
as the variability of off-farm wages decreases. 
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Age and the average hourly wage were also 
found to positively influence the probability of 
off-farm work. On the other hand, farm ex- 
perience, land tenure, and other sources of in- 
come negatively influenced the probability of 
o f f - f m  work. 
Even though these recent studies have ad- 
dressed the role of farm income variability and 
its relationship with off-farm labor for com- 
mercial farm operators, little is known about 
limited-resource farmers' off-farm labor sup- 
ply decisions under risk and income variabil- 
ity. The principal contribution of this study is 
that it is the first econometric study that ex- 
plores limited-resource farmers' supply of off- 
farm labor. By bringing together the literature 
on limited-resource producers and the vein of 
literature addressing off-farm labor, this anal- 
ysis sheds light on the role that farm income 
variability and other important economic var- 
iables play in the off-farm labor supply deci- 
sion of limited-resource farmers. By examin- 
ing factors that characterize the economic 
context of the producers, we provide insights 
into the origins of particular off-farm labor 
preferences. A better understanding of the per- 
ceptions of limited-resource farmers and the 
underlying causes of off-farm labor supply 
should contribute to a more informed dialogue 
with respect to the formulation of future farm 
policy. 
Off-Farm Labor Supply Model 
The off-farm labor supply model used for this 
study follows the model developed by Mishra 
and Goodwin. The optimal time allocation by 
married farm couples between leisure, off- 
farm work, and on-farm work is given by the 
maximization of expected utility assuming a 
Von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function 
subject to production and time constraints. The 
maximization problem can be written as 
(1) Max E[Ul = E[U(n, L,, L,)],  
where .rr represents household income and L, 
and L, represent the farmer and spouse hours 
of leisure, respectively. 
The profit function is given by 
where P is the price of the farm output; Q(*) 
is the farm production function; Z, and Z,  rep- 
resent the farmer and spouse human capital 
function, respectively; T, and T, represent the 
farmer and spouse time allocated to on-farm 
work, respectively; M is a vector of farm and 
household characteristics affecting production; 
C represents goods and services purchased in 
the market, r is a vector of input prices, G is 
other sources of income; W, and Ws represent 
the farmer and spouse hourly wage for off- 
farm work, respectively; and H, and Hs rep- 
resent the farmer and spouse time allocated to 
off-farm work, respectively. 
The household time constraint is given by 
T~, H, 2 0 for i = farmer, spouse 
Following Mishra and Goodwin, uncertain- 
ty in farm income is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean p and variance uZ. The 
expected utility function to be maximized can 
be written as 
Substituting the household time constraint 
in Equation (3) for HF and H, and solving for 
the first-order condition yields the following 
equation: 
Two important relationships can be derived 
from Equation (5). By totally differentiating 
Equation (5) with respect to T, and cr;, the 
sign of the following partial derivatives with 
respect to income variability can be inferred: 
~ T s  < 0, and - < 0. 
an$ 
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The negative signs on the partial deriva- 
tives imply that as farm income variability in- 
creases, both farmer and spouse will reduce 
their on-farm labor supply and, therefore, will 
increase their off-farm labor supply according- 
ly. 
It is expected that risk-neutral farmers will 
divide their labor supply between farm and 
nonfarm employment opportunities such that 
expected marginal returns are equal between 
the alternatives. When expected marginal re- 
turns are greater in one employment opportu- 
nity, more labor will be devoted to that alter- 
native. On the other hand, if producers are risk 
averse, and if they perceive the variance of 
wages (or earnings) to be greater in one oc- 
cupation than another, they will allocate less 
time to the more risky endeavor and will be 
willing to accept lower wages in the less risky 
alternative. 
Mishra and Goodwin made a significant 
contribution when they showed how farm in- 
come variability affects the off-farm work de- 
cision of farmers and spouses in an expected 
utility framework. However, their empirical 
model could have been enhanced through the 
inclusion of other important variables, such as 
observed off-farm wages. A more recent paper 
by Mishra and Holthausen assumed variability 
in both net farm income and off-farm wages, 
thus showing the effect that income and wage 
variability has on the producers' decision to 
seek off-farm work. 
In this paper, our main contributions are 
twofold. First, we obtain empirical evidence 
on the effect of observed off-farm wages on 
the decision of limited-resource farmers and 
spouses to seek off-farm work. Second, lim- 
ited-resource farmers are a significantly dif- 
ferent population than the commercial farms 
that have been investigated in past research. 
Thus, our analysis provides a strong test of the 
robustness of previous results. 
Econometric Procedure 
Most analyses of labor supply encounter 
situations in which many operators and spous- 
es are not employed off-farm, thus raising the 
issue of selectivity or censored samples. A 
standard approach to deal with censoring is the 
use of Tobit models. Previous research has 
suggested that operator off-farm labor deci- 
sions are made jointly with those of the spouse 
(Huffman and Lange; Lass and Gempesaw; 
Oluwole and Findeis). This implies that the 
off-farm labor supply of an operator could be 
influenced by the number of hours worked off 
the farm by the spouse. Therefore, an empir- 
ical model should take into consideration that 
the off-farm labor supply of the operator and 
the spouse is jointly determined; thus, simul- 
taneous equation estimators are required. An 
econometric model is based on Equation (4). 
It consists of a structural bivariate Tobit model 
of off-farm labor participation that is fined to 
the whole sample. The basic Tobit model can 
be embedded in a recursive simultaneous 
equations model (Greene) by: 
(7) Y ? = X , p  + YYT + E , ,  and 
Y f  = X 2 p  + r Y :  + e,, and 
The expected value of Y and the expression 
for the covariance matrix is given by 
+ ( u , ~ I u ? ) E ~ ,  and 
Other computations and retrievable results 
are the same as for the univariate Tobit model 
(Greene). Parameter estimates for Tobit mod- 
els do not directly correspond to changes in 
the expected value of the dependent variable 
brought about by changes in the independent 
variables. McDonald and Moffitt showed that, 
in the Tobit model, this effect is given by 
where Z = XP/u and F(Z) is the cumulative 
normal distribution function. Greene has ob- 
served that the McDonald and Moffitt decom- 
position is useful in obtaining the marginal ef- 
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fects of p independently from e, and vice 
versa. 
Data 
The limited-resource fanner survey was con- 
ducted in Mississippi during the summer of 
2000. The population of interest was expected 
to match the three criteria used by USDA-ERS 
in its definition of a limited-resource operator: 
1) gross sales of farm products less than 
$100,000 per year, 2) value of farm assets less 
than $150,000, and 3) farm operator house- 
hold income less than $20,000 per year. 
The Mississippi Agricultural Statistics Ser- 
vice (MASS) was contracted to sample and 
conduct the enumeration process. The survey 
was structured to capture both minority groups 
and farmers whose race was classified as Cau- 
casian. Second, the sample frame included 
those living in counties with less productive 
soils ("hill" counties) and individuals living 
in Mississippi delta counties, which tend to be 
more crop intensive. A sample of six counties, 
three from the delta and three from the hills, 
was chosen. Professional enumerators visited 
and recorded the producers' answers to a sur- 
vey instrument. 
One hundred percent of the farmers inter- 
viewed had a gross value of sales of farm 
products less than $100,000 per year. Ninety- 
three percent of the farmers interviewed had a 
value of farm assets less than $150,000. 
Eighty-two percent of the farmers interviewed 
had a total household income from farm and 
off-farm sources less than $20,000 per year. 
Even though our final working sample is a 
close approximation of the official definition 
of a limited-resource household, our measure 
of total household income remains a problem. 
As defined in our survey, total household in- 
come included gross cash income from the 
farm plus off-farm income. Nevertheless, 
when measuring the economic well-being of 
rural families, a net measure of income is gen- 
erally preferred. 
Unfortunately, net income from farming 
was not available because our survey instru- 
ment did not collect information on expenses. 
Because all the observations met one criterion 
and the majority of observations met two cri- 
teria or more, we relaxed the official limited- 
resource farm definition to require that only 
one condition be met (i.e., sales of farm prod- 
ucts less than $100,000 per year). Under this 
relaxation, the final working sample was 127 
limited-resource farms, once incomplete sur- 
veys, deceased farmers, or farmers that went 
out of business were removed. 
The summary statistics reported here rep- 
resent averages that have been expanded with 
the use of a MASS-constructed weight vari- 
able. This variable maintains consistency be- 
tween the reported summary statistics and the 
known population characteristics. 
Table 1 provides a description of the vari- 
ables involved in this study, and Table 2 pro- 
vides summary statistics on the dependent and 
independent variables. The empirical model 
related the total number of hours worked off- 
farm per week by the operator and the spouse 
to observable farm and household character- 
istics. The first deoendent variable is farmer 
hours of off-farm labor. Fifty-six percent of 
the farmers indicated that they work off-farm. 
Those who worked off-farm averaged 23 
hours per week. The second dependent vari- 
able is spouse hours of off-farm labor. Forty- 
five percent of the spouses indicated that they 
also work off-farm. Those who worked off- 
farm averaged 16 hours per week. The high 
percentage of non-off-farm labor participation 
indicates that the choice of an econometric 
model that takes into consideration censoring 
in the dependent variables is appropriate. 
The remaining variables in Table 1 are in- 
dependent explanatory variables included in 
the analysis. The first six variables (Delta 
County, total acres, farm income variability, 
participation in USDA programs, farm assets, 
and race) are measures of the household char- 
acteristics [M in Equation (4)]. Delta County 
indicates whether the farm is located in any of 
the Mississippi Delta counties surveyed. Re- 
gional variables have been used in past studies 
(Tokle and Huffman). It is expected that, be- 
cause of the crop agricultural activity in those 
counties, farmers and their spouses would tend 
to work more on-farm than elsewhere. Fifty- 
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Farmer Off-Farm Hours 
Spouse Off-Farm Hours 
Independent Variables 
Delta County 
Average hours per week that the operator works off- 
farm (hours). 
Average hours per week that the spouse works off- 
farm (hours). 
Dummy variable = 1 if farm is located in a Missis- 
sippi Delta county. 
Total Acres Total acres in the farm operation (acres). 
Farm Income Variability Dummy variable = 1 if gross income was below or 
above the average income of the previous 5 years. 
Participation in USDA Programs Dummy variable = 1 if farmer has participated in 
any USDA commodity programs in the past 5 
years. 
Farm Assets Dummy variable = 1 if farm asset value is greater 
than $50,000. 
Race Dummy variable = 1 if farmer is Caucasian. 
Income from non-USDA Government Percent of household's gross income from non- 
Sources USDA government sources, such as pensions, So- 
cial Security, etc. (%). 
Income from Livestock Production Percent of household's gross income from livestock 
production (95). 
Experience Operator's years of farming experience (years). 
Education Dummy variable = 1 if farmer obtained a high 
school diploma. 
Farmer Off-Farm Wage Rate Operator's observed off-farm labor wage rate (dol- 
lardhour). 
Spouse Off-Farm Wage Rate Spouse's observed off-farm labor wage rate (dollars1 
hour). 
six percent of the farms in the sample were 
located in the Delta counties. 
The total acres variable measures the total 
amount of acres available for farming. Sum- 
ner, Lass and Gempesaw, and Mishra and 
Goodwin used this variable in a previous 
study. On average, the limited-resource farm- 
ers in our sample had 145 acres of farmland. 
It is expected that increased farmland would 
be correlated with increased amounts of farm- 
ers' on-farm work, thus reducing the time 
available for off-farm labor. 
Farm income variability is measured as the 
variation below or above the average farm in- 
come from the previous 5 years. In previous 
studies, Mishra and Goodwin measured the 
coefficient of variation of giwss farm income, 
whereas Mishra and Holthausen measured the 
coefficient of variation of net farm income. It 
is expected that limited-resource farmers who 
perceive a downturn in farm income will tend 
to seek off-farm work as a means to stabilize 
income. Sixty-five percent of the farmers per- 
ceived a downturn in farm income. 
Participation in USDA programs measures 
farmers' past participation in farm programs. 
It takes a value of one if the farmer has par- 
ticipated in any USDA commodity programs 
in the past 5 years. This variable has not been 
used in previous studies. Nevertheless, on the 
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Table 2. Limited-Resource Farmers' and Spouses' Off-Farm Labor Supply: Summary Statis- 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Farmer Off-Farm HoursD 23.07 22.3484 0.00 60.00 
Spouse Off-Farm Hoursb 16.11 19.4647 0.00 50.00 
Delta County 0.56 0.4984 0.00 1.00 
Total Acres 145.82 144.3630 2.60 700.00 
Farm Income Variability 0.65 0.4723 0.00 1.00 
USDA Program 0.15 0.4264 0.00 1.00 
Income from non-USDA Government Sources 0.27 0.4094 0.00 1.00 
Income from Livestock 0.68 0.4172 0.00 1.00 
Farm Assets 0.69 0.4252 0.00 1.00 
Experience 12.02 17.1968 4.00 70.00 
Education 0.45 0.4950 0.00 1.00 
Race 0.74 0.5015 0.00 1.00 
Farmer Off-Farm Wage Rate 12.36 7.9201 0.00 45.00 
Spouse Off-Farm Wage Rate 7.32 7.7460 0.00 35.00 
'Fifty-six percent of the farmers in the sample indicated that they work off-farm. 
*Forty-five percent of the spouses in the sample indicated that they work off-farm. 
basis of the description of risk management 
needs of limited-resource farmers by Dismu- 
kes, Harwood, and Bentley, this variable 
should be included in the econometric study. 
It is expected that limited-resource farmers 
who participated less in government programs 
will be more motivated to work on-farm than 
those who did not. Fifteen percent of the pro- 
ducers indicated having participated in gov- 
ernment programs in the past. 
Farm assets take a value of one if the farm 
assets are in excess of $50,000. Previous stud- 
ies by Mishra, El-Osta, and Steele and Mishra 
and Goodwin have used the debt-to-assets ra- 
tio rather than farm assets as a proxy for 
wealth. It is expected that farmers with more 
farm assets will tend to seek less off-farm em- 
ployment. Sixty-nine percent of the farmers 
indicated that they belong to the higher asset 
value group. 
A dummy variable for race indicates 
whether the limited-resource farmer is Cau- 
casian. Tokle and Huffman used a race vari- 
able in a previous study. It is expected to re- 
veal any differences in off-farm labor supply 
with respect to race. Seventy-four percent of 
the farmers in the sample were Caucasians. 
The next two variables, income received 
from non-USDA government sources and in- 
come generated from livestock production, are 
related to other sources of income [G in Equa- 
tion (4)]. Lass and Gempesaw and Sumner 
used a measure of other income in previous 
studies. Income received from non-USDA 
government sources measures percentage of 
gross household income (measured as gross 
cash income from farming operation plus 
gross income from family members working 
off-farm) generated from pensions, social se- 
curity payments, or other retirement income. 
It is expected that operators who benefit more 
from external sources of income will be less 
interested in off-farm work as a means to re- 
duce income variability. On average, 27% of 
the limited-resource households reported in- 
come from non-USDA government payments. 
Income generated from livestock produc- 
tion measures the percentage of gross house- 
hold income (measured as gross cash income 
from farming operation plus gross income 
from family members working off-farm) gen- 
erated from livestock production. This vari- 
able has not been used in past studies. Nev- 
ertheless, on the basis of a study by Dismukes, 
Harwood, and Hoppe that shows the impor- 
tance of livestock production for the limited- 
resource household, this variable should be in- 
cluded in the econometric study. Because of 
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the extensive nature of livestock production, it 
is expected that operators who depend more 
on livestock production will have additional 
time available to work off-farm. On average, 
68% of the limited-resource households re- 
ported income from livestock production. 
The next two variables, farmer's years of 
farming experience and education, quantify 
the initial human capital endowment [Z in 
Equation (4)]. Experience measures years of 
farming experience. Mishra and Goodwiu and 
Sumner have used this variable in past studies. 
Because farming experience should be directly 
related to increased productivity and profit- 
ability, it is expected that older, experienced 
farmers will prefer to work on-farm rather 
than seek off-farm employment. The average 
farming experience of the limited-resource 
fanners in the sample was 12 years. 
Education indicates whether the operator 
has completed at least a high school degree. 
Tokle and Huffman and Sumner have used this 
variable in past studies. It is expected that 
more educated operators have better off-farm 
work opportunities. Forty-five percent of the 
farmers indicated having obtained a high 
school diploma. 
The last two variables, farmer's off-farm 
wage rate and spouse's off-farm wage rate, ex- 
plain the hourly wage of off-farm work [Win 
Equation (4)l. Tokle and Huffman have used 
these variables in a past study. Farmer off- 
farm wage rate measures the off-farm wage 
available to the limited-resource operator if he 
chooses to work off-farm. It is expected that 
higher wages would be positively correlated 
with the operator off-farm supply of labor. On 
average, the off-farm wage observed by the 
limited-resource farmers was $12 per hour. 
Spouse off-farm wage rate measures the 
off-farm wage available to the spouse if he1 
she chooses to work off-farm. Again, it is ex- 
pected that higher wages would be positively 
correlated with spouse off-farm supply of la- 
bor. On average, the off-farm wage observed 
for the spouse was $7 per hour. 
Results 
The model results reported in Table 3 indicate 
that several of the explanatory variables are 
highly significant in explaining off-fami labor 
supply decisions of limited-resource farmers 
and their spouses. Similar to the results of 
Huffman, Huffman and Lange, Lass and Gem- 
pesaw, and Oluwole and Fiudeis, and in con- 
trast to the results of Mishra and Goodwin, the 
results suggest that the labor supply decisions 
of limited-resource farmers and their spouses 
are jointly determined. The estimated cross- 
equation coefficient of the disturbances (cor- 
relation coefficient) in the bivariate Tobit mod- 
el is 24.307 for the sampled operators and 
spouses and is significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. Implications of this result are 
that the random disturbances in limited-re- 
source couples' off-farm work supply deci- 
sions are influenced in the same direction and 
that the wage-work participation decision of 
manied limited-resource farmer couples in 
Mississippi are not statistically independent. 
Therefore, the bivariate Tobit result is appro- 
priate. The predicted probability of working 
off-farm is given by F(Z)(XPIu), where F(Z) 
is the cumulative standard normal distribution, 
Xp is a mean vector of the values of the in- 
dependent variables multiplied by their Tobit 
coefficient, and u is the standard deviation of 
the error term. There is a 73% probability that 
an average limited-resource operator will seek 
work off-farm. On the other hand, there is an 
83% probability that an average spouse will 
seek work off-farm. 
Total acres are negatively correlated with 
farmers' and spouses' off-farm labor supply. 
The coefficient is significant for the spouse 
only. This result contrasts with previous stud- 
ies (Lass and Gempesaw; Mishra and Good- 
win; Sumner). Our results suggest that the 
spouse's on-farm labor increases as acres in- 
crease, thus making the spouse a marginal 
supplier of on-farm labor. In a recent study of 
limited-resource farmers, Dismukes, Har- 
wood, and Bentley recognized the increasing 
participation of the spouse on the farm. Many 
spouses become primary decision-makers later 
in life, as farmers become older or incapaci- 
tated (Effland, Hoppe, and Cook). 
Contrary to expectations, farm income var- 
iability was not significant in explaining the 
limited-resource farmer and spouse off-farm 
476 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2004 
Table 3. Limited-Resource Farmers' and Spouses' Off-Farm Labor Supply: Bivariate Tobit 
Model Results 
Farmer Spouse 
Maximum Marginal Maximum Marginal 
Likelihood Effect Likelihood Effect 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 15.095 24.45 1 
(13.529) (9.146) 
Delta County -9.135 -7.125 -0.399 -0.311 
(7.490) (3.656) 
Total Acres -0.024 -0.019 -0.016 -0.012*** 
(0.027) (0 . rn)  
Farm Income Van'ability - 1.759 -1.372 -3.163 -2.467 
(7.052) (2.799) 
USDA Rogram 23.194 18.091* 0.378 0.295 
(16.747) (7.710) 
Income from non-USDA -0.481 -0.375*** -0.178 -0.139*** 
Government Sources (0.125) (0.054) 
Income from Livestock 0.250 0.195*** 0.542 0.423 
(0.142) (0.083) 
Farm Assets 6.484 -5.058 -0.875 -0.663 
(8.892) (4.177) 
Experience -0.453 -0.353* -0.194 -0.151*** 
(0.294) (0.1 13) 
Education 3.612 2.817 4.940 3.853** 
(6.796) (3.028) 
Race 1.661 1.296 0.787 0.614 
(7.337) (3.934) 
Farmer Off-Farm Wage 1.392 1.086*** -0.556 -0.434*** 
(0.530) (0.256) 
Spouse Off-Farm Wage -1.142 -0.891** 1.239 0.966*** 
(0.526) (0.228) 
u = 24.307*** 
(3.366) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses an standard errors. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical significance 
at the a = 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
labor supply decision. It seems that the deci- 
sion to work off-farm is likely to be a response 
to overall low farm income rather than varia- 
tions in income. This result is different from 
those obtained by Mishra and Goodwin and 
Mishra and Holthausen. Both studies found 
that, as farm income variability increases, farm 
families seek additional off-farm employment 
to reduce the variance in their household in- 
come. Nevertheless, Mishra and Goodwin 
used 10-year income history of farm house- 
holds to construct a measure of variance in 
farm income, whereas Mishra and Holthausen 
used 26-year net farm income data from the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. In this study, 
we elicited a measure of farm income vari- 
ability from the farmers by asking them to rate 
their perceived farm income variability below 
or above the average farm income from the 
previous 5 years. This measure of farm in- 
come variability might have limitations. More 
research is needed to verify this finding. 
Contrary to expectations, past participation 
in USDA programs is positively associated 
with farmers' off-farm labor supply. In a ques- 
tion not reported here, limited-resource farm- 
ers surveyed in this study indicated that cur- 
rent government programs designed to reduce 
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farm risk and income variability are not tai- 
lored to meet their specific needs. Therefore, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that farmers 
would seek off-farm work as a means to re- 
duce income variability. The results suggest 
that farmers that had participated in govern- 
ment programs in the past would be expected 
to work 18 hours more per week off-farm. 
Additional income from non-USDA gov- 
ernment payments is negatively correlated 
with farmers' and spouses' off-farm labor sup- 
ply. This result is consistent with Mishra and 
Goodwin. The coefficient is significant for 
both farmer and spouse. It is expected that 
non-USDA government payments could less- 
en the need for off-farm labor by providing 
the farm household with an alternative source 
of income. The results suggest that a 10% in- 
crease in income from non-USDA government 
payments decreases the farmers' expected off- 
farm labor supply by almost 4 hours per week. 
Similarly, the spouses' expected off-farm la- 
bor supply is decreased by almost 1.4 hours 
per week. This result has important implica- 
tions for rural policy. Both off-farm work and 
income transfers contribute to reduced farm 
income variability and increase the likelihood 
that limited-resource farmers will remain 
farming. 
Income earned from livestock production is 
positively correlated with farmers' off-farm la- 
bor supply. Because livestock production is 
often a less labor-intensive activity, the oper- 
ators would have additional time to seek off- 
farm work as a means to compensate for low 
farm income. The results suggest that a 10% 
increase in the percentage of income from 
livestock production increases the farmer's ex- 
pected off-farm labor supply by almost 2 
hours per week. 
According to expectations, experience is 
negatively correlated with farmers' and spous- 
es' off-farm labor supply. This result is con- 
sistent with the work of Mishra and Goodwin 
and Sumner. It is expected that older, experi- 
enced farmers and spouses will prefer to work 
on-farm rather than seek off-farm employ- 
ment. The results suggest that experienced 
farmers would reduce their expected supply of 
off-farm labor by 3.5 hours per week for each 
additional 10 years of farming experience. 
Similarly, the spouses' expected off-farm sup- 
ply of labor is reduced by 1.5 hours per week 
for each additional 10 years of farming expe- 
rience. 
Years of formal education are positively 
correlated with farmers' and spouses' off-farm 
labor supply. This result is consistent with the 
work of Goodwin and Holt; Mishra and Good- 
win; Oluwole and Findeis; Sumner; and Tokle 
and Huffman. However, the coefficient is sig- 
nificant for the spouse only. This might sug- 
gest that a high school diploma increases the 
probability that the spouse will find off-farm 
work, thus increasing the amount of off-farm 
work hours he or she is willing to allocate. 
The results suggest that spouses who obtained 
a high school diploma would be expected to 
work almost 4 hours more per week off-farm. 
The farmers' off-farm wage rate is posi- 
tively correlated with farmers' off-farm labor 
supply and negatively correlated with the 
spouse off-farm labor supply. The coefficient 
is significant for both farmer and spouse. This 
result implies that as farmers perceive better 
wages in the labor market, they tend to in- 
crease their off-farm labor supply. On the oth- 
er hand, an increase in the farmers' off-farm 
wage rate decreases the spouses' off-farm la- 
bor supply. According to the results, an hourly 
wage increase of one dollar increases the 
farmers' off-farm labor supply by 1 hour per 
week and decreases the spouses' off-farm la- 
bor supply by almost 0.5 hour per week. 
The spouses' off-farm wage rate is nega- 
tively correlated with the farmers' off-farm la- 
bor supply and positively correlated with the 
spouses' off-farm labor supply. The coefficient 
is significant for both farmers and spouses. 
This result implies that as farmers perceive 
better wages in the labor market for their 
spouses, they substitute spouses' off-farm la- 
bor for farmers' off-farm labor. According to 
the results, an hourly wage increase for the 
spouses of 1 dollar decreases the farmers' off- 
farm labor supply by almost 0.9 hours per 
week and increases the spouses' off-farm la- 
bor supply by almost 1 hour per week. Given 
the importance of off-farm income for the lim- 
ited-resource household, programs aimed at 
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increasing the human capital of the spouses 
would have a double positive effect by in- 
creasing the expectation of better off-farm 
wages and, therefore, reducing the likelihood 
of the farmers seeking off-farm employment. 
Conclusions 
This paper examined the determinants of off- 
farm labor participation decisions of limited- 
resource farmers and their spouses, focusing 
on farm income variability. It also attempted 
to determine whether farm couples jointly 
make such decisions. This paper contributes to 
the body of literature directed at understanding 
the labor supply of farm families, with the ad- 
ditional focus on limited-resource farmers, 
which is a group of producers that has not re- 
ceived a substantial amount of attention from 
researchers. Our results showed that farm in- 
come variability is not significant in the lim- 
ited-resource farmer and spouse decision to 
seek off-farm work. It seems that the decision 
to work off-farm is likely to be a response to 
overall low farm income rather than variation 
in income. Given the importance of farm in- 
come variability in the formulation of public 
policy for agriculture, more research is needed 
to verify this finding. 
This study contributes by pointing out the 
importance of the economic conditions in the 
off-farm labor decision of both farmer and 
spouse. When off-farm wages are high, both 
farmer and spouse tend to seek additional off- 
farm work and thus reduce the likelihood of 
farm income variability. As Mishra and Hol- 
thausen point out, changes in the minimum 
wage laws could have a strong effect on the 
decision of limited-resource households to 
work off-farm. Also, off-farm income has 
played a prominent role in supplementing low 
net farm returns and contributed to the stabil- 
ity of farm household income and the number 
of farm residents in recent years. Rural devel- 
opment policies that encourage the develop- 
ment of off-farm employment opportunities 
could contribute to aid both low-income farm 
households that leave agriculture and farm 
households that prefer to pursue dual employ- 
ment on- and off-farm. 
Further research is needed to examine other 
important factors affecting the off-farm em- 
ployment decision of limited-resource farmers. 
Also, there is a greater role for extension ed- 
ucation and research programs that address the 
effect of current risk management programs 
on the limited-resource household. It is in the 
best interest of limited-resource farm operators 
to increase one or more of their household in- 
come, assets, or sales to move out of the lim- 
ited-resource farm category. Given the interest 
by government agencies to serve their clien- 
tele equally and fairly, there is likely to be a 
continued demand for research that will guide 
policy in this area. 
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